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ANNALS OF IOWA.
VOL. VI, No. 6, , DEB MOINES, IOWA, JULY, 190i. 3D SEEIES.
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE IN COREESPON-
DENCE OF THE TIME.
ARRANGED BY REV. DR. WILLIAM SALTER.
In 1903 the United States Government Printing Office published "State
Papers and Correspondence bearing upon the Louisiana Purchase," io a
volume of 299 pages. The correspondence of other public men of the
time, as published in their Works,* adds further information upon the
snbject. The whole correspondence is heavy and voluminous. Some
selections from it, arranged in chronological order, will afford a lucid,
compact and authentic view of the course of events in that great crisis of
American history.
That the question, "Who shall own Louisiana?" was a snbject of
inqniry and concern to Washington soon after he became President, ap-
pears from his correspondence of that time with JefEerson, then Secretary
of State, and Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. War was then threat-
ened between Great Britain and Spain.
WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON ( T H E SAME TO JEFFERSON ).
U. S., Aug. 27, 1790.
Provided the dispute between Great Britain and Spain
should come to the decision of arms, there is no doubt in my
mind that New Orleans and the Spanish posts above it on
the Mississippi will be among the first attempts of the
former, and that the reduction of them will be undertaken
from Detroit.
The consequences of having so formidable and enterpris-
ing people as the British on both our flanks and rear, with
their navy in front, as they respect our western settlements,,
which may be seduced thereby, are obvious.
What then should be the answer of the Executive in case
»Hamilton's Works, vol. iv. Rufus King, Life and Correspondence, vols, ii, iii, iv.
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Lord Dorchester* should apply for permission to march
troops from Detroit to the Mississippi?
JEFFERSON TO PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.
Aug. 28, 1790.
I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the
dangers which will attend our Government if Louisiana and
the Floridas be added to the British empire, that in my
opinion we ought to make ourselves parties in the general
war expected to take place, should this be the only means of
preventing the calamity. But we should defer this step as
long as possible, because war is full of chances, which may
relieve us of the necessity of interfering, so that I am for
preserving neutrality as long, and entering into the war, as
late as possible.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
NEW YORK, Sept. 15, 1790.
Urgent avocations (putting laws of the last session in a
train of execution) and a desire of reflecting maturely, and
giving the reasons for the result of my reflections fully, have
caused me to delay longer than I wished the answer to the
questions with which you honored me.
. It is not to be forgotten that we received from
France in our late Revolution essential succor, and from
Spain valuable countenance and some direct aid. It is not to
be doubted that the part they took is to be attributed, not to
an attachment to our independence or liberty, but to a desire
of diminishing the power of Great Britain by severing the
British empire. In the progress of the war they lent us
money. France has made us one loan since. Her conduct
bore the marks of a liberal policy. She did not endeavor to
extract from us, as the price of it, any disadvantageous or
humiliating concessions. The conduct of Spain towards us
presents a picture far less favorable. The direct aid we re.r
L 'Governor of Canada.
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ceived from her during the war was inconsiderable. She
refrained from acknowledging our independence, nor made
a treaty with us; she obstructs our sharing in the navigation
of the Mississippi, and has not scrupled to intrigue with
leading individuals in the western country to seduce them
from our interests.
An increase of the means of annoying us is
a certain ill consequence of the acquisition of the Floridas
and Louisiana by the British, not only from contiguity to
our territory, but from the increased facility of acquiring an
influence over the Indian tribes in the United States.
. . A government scarcely ever had stronger mo-
tives to avoid war than the United States at the present
juncture. They have much to dread from war; much to exr-
pect from peace; something to hope from negotiation, in
case of a rupture between Britain and Spain. We are just
recovering from the effects of a long, arduous, and exhaust-
ing war. The people just begin to realize the sweets of
repose. Our national government is in its infancy. There
is a general disinclination to war in all classes. The support
of public opinion (perhaps more essential to our government
than to any other ) could only be looked for in a war evident-
ly resulting from necessity. To the people at large the
quarrel would be apt to have the appearance of having
originated in a desire of shielding Spain from the arms of
Britain. It seems our true policy to cultivate neutrality.
. . . The acquisition of the Spanish territories bor-
•dering on the United States by Great Britain would be
dangerous to us. The same danger, if not to the same ex-
tent, will exist, should the territories remain in the hands of
Spain.*
TIMOTHY PICKERING, SECRETARY OP STATE, TO RUFUS KING,
UNITED STATES MINISTER AT LONDON. "
FEB. 15, 1797. We have often heard that the French
Government contemplated the repossession of Louisiana.
•Hamilton's Works, 1851, iv, 48-69.
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You will see all the mischief to be apprehended from such
an event; the Spaniards will certainly be more quiet and
safe neighbors.
JUNE 20, 1797. We are not without apprehension that
France means to renew the ancient plan of her monarch
(Louis XIV), of circumscribing and encircling what now
constitutes the Atlantic States. To the execution of a plan
so dangerous to our union and peace, every real American
must be firmly opposed.
EUFUS KING TO T. PICKERING, SECKETAKY OF STATE.
LONDON, AUG. 5, 1797. The refusal to evacuate the
Spanish posts (Natchez, etc.,) on the Mississippi according
to the Treaty, the spoliation's upon our commerce by the
Spanish privateers, joined to the rumor that Spain has ceded
Louisiana to France, lead me to apprehend that France haa
really become the proprietor of that extensive and undefined,
region.
EUFUS KING TO THE SECKETAEY OF STATE.
LONDON, March 29, 1801.
The project has been discussed in the Directory, to obtain
from Spain a cession of Louisiana and the. Floridas. What
was meditated has been executed; the cession of Tuscany to
the infant Duke of Parma by the treaty between France and
Austria forms a more valuable compensation to this branch
of the House of Spain than was formerly thought of, and
adds credit to the opinion that Spain in return has actually
ceded Louisiana and the Floridas to France.
. . I am apprehensive that Louisiana and the Flor-
idas may be given to the French emigrants, as England once
thought of giving them to the American tories. . . . I
hear that General CoUot,* with a considerable number of'
disaffected'and exiled Englishmen, Scotchmen and Irishmen,
is soon to proceed from France to the United States.
•A French military officer, who had visited Louisiana in 1796.
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Whether their voyage has any relation to the cession of
Louisiana is matter of conjecture, but having heard it in
•connection with that project, I think proper to mention it to
you. What effect a plain and judicious representation upon
this subject to the French Grovernment by a minister of tal-
ents and entitled to confidence, would be likely to have, is
beyond my means of judging; but on this account, as well as
others, it is a subject of regret that we have not such a
character at this time at Paris.
LONDON, Oct. 9, 1801. Had France retained Egypt, her
commercial and colonial views would have been chiefly con-
ñned to the Mediterranean. . . This enterprise having
failed, St. Domingo and her other American colonies will
engage her attention, and perhaps Louisiana may be coveted
as an asylum for their emigrants, as England once thought
of making it a refuge for ours. May the same fortune
which disappointed the views of England in like manner
frustrate those of France!
BOBEET TBOUP TO BUFUS KING.
NEW YOBK, Oct. 14, 1801.
The Chancellor (Kobert K. Livingston) is here with his
family on the way to the Jacobinical paradise. He will
embark on the Boston frigate that has come to waft him
across the ocean. Report announces that the headquarter
gentleman (President Jefferson) wished him to go in a mer-
chant vessel; but he replied with true democratic spirit that
he would not go if they did not send him in a government
ship.
BUFUS KING TO B. B. LIVINGSTON, PABIS.
LONDON, March 23, 1802.
We may, if we deem it to our interest, without impro-
priety, attempt to acquire the legitimate title to Louisiana
and the Floridas. If the title can be obtained in no other
way than a direct purchase, a large sum of money will alone
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procure it. Great as would be the benefit to us, I see little
which authorizes us to expect that a measure of such magni-
tude, which would impose burthens upon our people, would
be received with favor.
France is one of the great powers which in
some sort control the affairs of the whole earth; on this
account it seems the duty of those who have a part to act in
the concerns of other States, to study the genius and en-
deavor to understand the character of this reckless and
powerful nation, which can only be opposed with success,
when openly opposed; I do not mean force, but moral resist-
ance, which consists in the frank explanation of the injuries
we foresee, and the declaration of our own rights and duties.
With this way of thinking, I would lose no time in tell-
ing France our apprehensions, at the same time that I
assured her of our earnest desire to live iu harmony and
friendship; I would inform our own people that I had done
so. The truth should not be disguised from ourselves or
others, that we are the first power in our hemisphere, and
disinclined to perform the part of the second. Sentiments
of this sort openly and unostentatiously propagated would
have the effect to check measures to divide us, and enable
us to defeat them, should they be attempted.
B. R. LIVINGSTON TO THE SEOHETARY OF STATE.
PARIS, Sept. 1, 1802.
There never was a Government in which less could be
done by negotiation than here. There is no people, no legis-
lature, no counsellors. One man is everything. He seldom
asks advice, and never hears it unasked. His ministers are
mere clerks, and his legislature and counsellors parade offi-
cers.
R. R. LIVINGSTON TO PRESIDENT JEFFERSON.
PARIS, Oct. 28, 1802.
I had an interesting conversation two days ago with
Joseph Bonaparte. He said, my brother is his own coun-
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sellor, but we are good brothers, and I have access to him at;
all times. He told me that he had read my notes on Louisi-
ana, and that he had conversed upon the subject with the
First Consul, who, he found, had read them with attention,
and told him that he had nothing more at heart than to be
on the best terms with the United States.
ß. K. LIVINGSTON TO CITIZEN BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL OF
FRANCE AND PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC.
PAEIS, Feb. 27, 1803.
A long letter on the American claims for French Spoliation on Ameri-
can 8hip8, and for the cession of the Floridas and New Orleans to the
United States.—Síaíe Papers and Correspondence, pp. 115-122.
Mr. King performed initiatory and accessorial part in the attainment
of Louisiana.—Charles J. Ingersoll; "Recollections."
R. KING TO R. R. LIVINGSTON, PARIS.
LONDON, March 11, 1803.
Should we like to see the English in New Orleans, not
with view of keeping it, but to prevent its going into the
hands of France; perhaps to assist us in acquiring a title to,
and the possession of it? If you are authorized to negoti-
ate a purchase, would not the occupation • by the English
beneflt your bargain, it being understood that, if we obtain
the title, they would give us the possession? This is mere
speculation, but may be worth consideration.
RUFOS KING TO JAMES MADISON, SECRETARY OF STATE.
LONDON, March 28, 1803.
War (against England) will probably be declared and
commenced by France.
APRIL 2, 1803. In a late conversation with Mr. Adding-
ton, he observed to me, if the war happen, it would perhaps
be one of their flrst attempts to occupy New Orleans. I
interrupted him, saying, I hoped the measure would be well
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weighed before it should be attempted, that true it was we
could not see with indifFerence that country in the hands of
France, but it would be equally contrary to our views, to see
it in the possession of England. We had no objection to
Spain continuing to possess it ; they were quiet neighbors,
and we looked forward without impatience to events which,
in the ordinary course of things, must at no distant day
annex this country to the United States. Mr. Addington
desired me to be assured that England would not accept the
country, were all agreed to give it to her; that were she to
occupy it, it would not be to keep it, but to prevent another
power from obtaining it, and this would be best effected by
its belonging to the United States. I expressed acquiescence
in the last part of his remark, but observed that if the coun-
try should be occupied by England, it would be suspected
to be in concert with the United States, and might involve
us in misunderstanding with a power with which we desired
to live in peace. He said: If you can obtain it, well; but if
not, we ought to prevent it going into the hand of France,
though you may be assured nothing shall be done injurious
to the United States.
R. R. LIVINGSTON TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
PARIS, April 11, 1803.
I have written Mr. King, pressing him to stay until a
successor is appointed. The moment is so critical that we
cannot justify being without a minister in England, and he
is a very useful one.
MADISON TO LIVINGSTON AND MONROE, PARIS.
DEPAETMBNT OF STATE, April 18, 1803.
[This letter contains a reference to British designs for the acquisition
of the country now embracing Iowa and Minnesota, where British traders
•were carrying on a profitable fur trade.]
The anxiety which Great Britain has shown to extend
her domain to the Mississippi, the uncertain extent of her
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claims from the north to the south beyond the western limits
of the United States, and the attention she has paid to the.
northwest coast of America, make it probable that she will
connect with a war on this occasion, a pretension to the
acquisition of the country on the west side of the Mississippi,
understood to be ceded by Spain to France, or at least of
that portion of it lying between that river and the Missouri.
The evils involved in such an extent of her possessions in
our neighborhood, and in such a hold on the Mississippi, are
obvious.
RUFUS KING TO B. R. LIVINGSTON, PARIS.
LONDON, May 12, 1803.
Met Mr. Addington by appointment; spoke to him
respecting the probable cession of Louisiana by France to
the United States. He declared his hope that it had taken
place. I alluded to the provisional expedition (by England)
to occupy New Orleans. He said that would be wholly out
of view if we acquired it, and on this point was very explicit
that England would be satisfied if the United States obtained
Louisiana.
MAY 15. E. King communicates to Lord Hawkesbury information
of the treaty of cession, April 30th.
MAY 19. Lord Hawkesbury replies that his Majesty receives the
intelligence with pleasure and cordial assurances of good will.
R. R. LIVINGSTON TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
PARIS, May 12, 1803.
On my arrival I found the credit and character of our
Nation very low. They were considered speculators, whose
god was money. The features of our statesman, drawn from
caricatures in our newspapers, were viewed as likenesses, and
the democracy of America was believed to be the mad
Jacobonism of France. The President was considered as
among the most mad, because the head of the party, and it
was not doubted that his minister in France partook of his
phrenzy. Some of my former friends were sent to sound
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me on the subject of the existing Grovernment here. Satis-
fied that nothing short of what had taken place could have
lessened the calamities of France, I answered them in such
a manner as to satisfy them that I meant to have no in-
trigues with its enemies. I avoided all connection with
them, and in consequence began to acquire a degree of favor
at Court.
Among the most favorite projects of the First Consul
was the colonization of Louisiana. He saw in it a new
Egypt, a colony to counterbalance the eastern establishment,
of Britain. . . . To render the acquisition still more
agreeable to the people, exaggerated accounts of its fertility,,
etc., were sold in every print shop. My first endeavor was
to remove these impressions from the minds of the people
most likely to be consulted, in which I was successful. But
they all told me that it was a favorite project with the First
Consul, nor would any of them hear of disposing of it by
sale. As he had before read with considerable attention my
Notes on the relative naval force and commerce of France,
England, and the United States, and paid me some compli-
ments upon it, I got the essay, "Will it be advantageous to
France to take possession of Louisiana?" under his eye. It
was read with attention, and, though I think it weakened
his belief in the importance of Louisiana, yet, as he does not
easily relinquish his plans, he still prosecuted them though
with less ardor. As I knew that his ministers seldom dared
to interpose their opinions, it was necessary to apply direct-
ly to him, through the only person who was supposed to-
have any influence with him. Some days after, that person
told me that the First Consul had read it with attention,,
and approved my proposition in part, not to the extent I had
proposed. I am satisfied that from this period they had
determined to let us have New Orleans and the territory
above the Arkansas, in exchange for certain commercial ad-
vantages, but that nothing could be done until the business
with Spain was terminated. This had the effect of removing
every doubt relative to my sentiments of the present Gov-
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ernment, and led to a kind of personal consideration I have
ever since enjoyed here. . . . Two causes suspended
any absolute determination: 1st. The state of the negotia-
tion with Spain ; 2nd. My want of power or instructions ;
while I endeavored to pave the way for something conclusive
when I should receive them.
The First Consul had an idea that by taking possession
of the country, he could more advantageously treat with our
Government; and Talleyrand told me that everything would
be arranged, but they must first take possession.
. . . A sale has always been disrelished, as I was
constantly told by Talleyrand and Marbois. What I believe
principally drove the First Consul to this measure was the
promise he hastily made me to pay our debt fully and
promptly, which he found himself in no situation to fulfil,
and yet knew not how to elude, as I pressed it at every turn,
and told Talleyrand and all the Consul's friends, that I had
communicated it not only to the Government, but to the
creditors, with the declaration that they might rely on it, as
no one could believe that a man of the Consul's character,
a sovereign and a soldier, could break his word.
The resolutions proposed in Congress in conse-
quence of the business of New Orleans, which I enclosed to
the minister, proved we were not to be trified with, and the
probability of a rupture with England hastened their deter-
mination. They saw as M. Talleyrand told me, that if they
gave what I asked (the country north of the Arkansas river),
the rest was not worth keeping. This, and the impossibility
of otherwise keeping faith with us, produced a determination
to sell. There was a moment, even after Talleyrand called
on me to set a price, that I thought the whole might drop
through. It was then, he pretended he spoke without
authority, that Louisiana was not theirs. But that mystery
was cleared the next day.
As I believe that next to the negotiation which secured
our independence, this is the most important that the United
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States have ever entered into, I thought everything that led
to it might interest you and the President. I wished you
to be minutely acquainted with every step I had taken; my
verbal communications with everybody to whom I had
access, it would be impossible to detail. Nothing was
neglected on my part, and I hope the issue may be accept-
able to our country.
LIVINGSTON AND MONROE TO MADISON.
PARIS, May 12, 1803.
We have the pleasure to transmit to you a treaty which
we have concluded with the French Kepublic for the pur-
chase and cession of Louisiana. The negotiation on the
part of France was committed to M. Marbois, Minister of the
Treasury, whose conduct has received the sanction of his
Government, as appears by the ratification of the First
Consul. An acquisition of so great an extent was not con-
templated by our appointment; but we are persuaded that
the circumstances and considerations which induced us to
make it will justify us in the measure to our Government
and Country.
Before the negotiation commenced we were apprized that
the First Consul had decided to ofPer the United States, by
sale, the whole of Louisiana, and not a part of it. So that
we had to decide whether we would treat for the whole, or
jeopardize, if not abandon, the hope of acquiring any part.
We did not long hesitate, but proceeded to treat for the
whole. On mature consideration we concluded a treaty on
the best terms we could obtain.
. The First Consul had promised Louisiana as an
asylum to those who had been unfortunate in the Revolution.
. . . We received a letter from Mr. King, in which
he says that in case of war, which he deemed inevitable, the
British Government contemplated taking possession of New
Orleans. He desired information to be communicated to
that Government whether it had been ceded to the United
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States, as he presumed a knowledge thereof would prevent
the measure. We gave an immediate reply to his letter.
We made the same communication to the British Ambassa-
dor here (Lord Whit worth), who expressed himself well
satisfied with the event.
JAMES MONROE TO THE VIRGINIA SENATORS.
PARIS, May 25, 1803.
The decision to offer us the territory by sale was not the
effect of any management of mine, for it took place before
I reached Paris, nor of my colleague, or it would have taken
place sooner. Being postponed until my arrival in France
is a full proof that it was the result of the causes mentioned:
an approaching rupture with England, the character our
country had formed, and its pacific relations with and respect
for this Government (the French Republic).
Personally I pretend to nothing but zeal and industry
after I got here, a merit equally due to my colleague. It is
proper to add that I expect no misrepresentation from him,
and I am happy to bear testimony in the most explicit man-
ner in favor of his zealous, sincere and diligent cooperation
through the whole of this business.
LIVINGSTON AND MONROE TO MADISON.
PARIS, June 7, 1803.
We thought we could discover some symptoms of discon-
tent in the Government with the bargain it had made. We
are convinced that if the bargain was not complete, or was
within the reach of the Government, that it would not take
place, even on terms different from those stipulated.
The First Consul in the moment of chagrin at what he may
consider a bad bargain (we think a good bargain for him ),
might have so compromitted himself as to have made the
transaction a cause of future discontent between the two
nations, instead of the establishment of perpetual peace.
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LIVINGSTON TO MADISON.
PARIS, June 25, 1803.
You will remember that in one of my letters I request
you to set on foot a negotiation with Britain for ascertaining
your northwestern boundary. I was at that time endeavor-
ing to excite an alarm here that should put us in possession
of the country above the Arkansas. I have felt distressed
that I never found these suggestions noticed or encouraged
by our Government. But presuming they ultimately would
be, I have concealed my want of powers, and acted as if I
possessed them; and to this, as well as to the firm attitude
our Government took, you may attribute the success of our
negotiation. I hope nothing will prevent your immediate
ratification, without altering a syllable of the terms. Be
persuaded that France is sick of the bargain, that Spain is
much dissatisfied, and that the slightest pretense will lose
you the treaty. Nothing has raised the reputation of our
country in Europe so high as thé conduct of our Govern-
ment upon this occasion.
MADISON TO R. R. LIVINGSTON.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, July 29, 1803.
The difference in the diplomatic titles given to Mr.
Monroe from that given to you, and which you understood
to have ranked him above you, was the result of an error in
the clerk who copied the document, which escaped attention
when signed. It was not the intention of the President that
any distinction of grade should be made between you. Ac-
cording to Vattel, the characters of Minister Plenipotentiary
and Envoy Extraordinary are of the same grade.
MADISON TO LIVINGSTON AND MONROE.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, July 29, 1803.
In concurring with the French Government to treat for
the whole of Louisiana, although the western part was not
embraced by your powers, you were justified by the solid
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reasons you gave for it, and I am charged by the President
to express to you his entire approbation for so doing.
When your instructions were made out, the object was limit-
ed to the establishment of the Mississippi as our boundary.
It was not presumed that more would be sought by the
United States with hope of success. Nor was it to be sup-
posed that an arrangement with Spain for returning to her
the country on the other side, would not be preferred to
a sale of it to the United States. It is just ground for
felicitation that the crisis (war between France and England)
has issued under your zealous exertions in the extensive
acquisition beyond the Mississippi. ^
The note of Mr. Livingston, stating to the
French Government the idea of ceding the western country
above the Arkansas, was not received here till April 5th,
more than a month after the commission and instruction had
been forwarded.
BUFUS KING TO CHBISTOPHEB GOBE.
NEW YOBK, January 4, 1804.
The relinquishment of the (proposed) French expedition
(from Holland) to colonize Louisiana, and the cession of
Louisiana to us, is solely to be ascribed to the war with
England.
The overture to cede Louisiana came from
France, and not from our envoys. It is due Mr. Livingston,
whose zeal upon the subject had prompted him to use un-
wearied and various exertions to convince France of the im-
policy of her expedition to Louisiana, to declare that this
business was so far settled before Monroe's arrival at Paris
that nothing remained for him to do but to give his consent
and signature to the contract.
The debates in Parliament upon the Treaty of
Amiens show the strong aversion of England to the occupa-
tion of Louisiana by France, and must have satisfied both
France and America that, unless vanquished, England would
not consent to Louisiana being colonized by her rival.

